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Chapter 6 Mathematics and Other Non-Natural 
Subjects
6.1 Introduction
The arguments of the last chapter, together with those in chapter 3, amount to a realist 
package. In chapter 3 I argued for a realist theory of content, a theory which implies, 
as I observed in section 3.13, that there is no conceptual guarantee that our procedures 
for forming beliefs should yield beliefs which are true. Such a theory establishes a 
sense in which our beliefs answer to an independent world: the claims made by our 
beliefs conceptually outstrip the basis on which we form those beliefs. 
This gap between the basis for judgements and their content creates room for 
sceptical threats. The theory of knowledge developed in the last chapter, however, 
shows how such threats can be dealt with. For even if there is no conceptual guarantee, 
issuing from the theory of content, that judgement and truth should co-vary, they 
might still co-vary as a matter of a posteriori fact. The arguments of the last chapter 
showed how this might work for the general run of our beliefs about the natural world: 
there may be good empirical evidence that our belief-forming procedures are reliable 
producers of truth, even if there is no conceptual guarantee of this. So the last chapter 
in effect added a realist theory of knowledge to the realist theory of content developed 
in chapter 3, by showing how, even though truth conceptually transcends evidence, 
they may still co-vary as a matter of empirical fact. 
So realism, as I shall use the term henceforth, has two components. First, it requires a 
realist theory of content, according to which our beliefs answer to an independent 
world. And then it deals with the resulting sceptical threat by means of a realist theory 
of knowledge, according to which truth and judgement co-vary as matter of a 
posteriori fact, even if not of conceptual necessity. 
So far, however, I have focused exclusively on "natural beliefs", in the sense of 
beliefs about the natural world. What about non-natural beliefs, such as beliefs about 
mathematics, or morality, or about modal questions of necessity and possibility? In 
chapter 3 I explicitly excluded such non-natural beliefs from the scope of the 
teleological theory of content, on the grounds that the teleological theory requires 
beliefs that are relevant to the success of actions, and it is debatable whether non-
natural beliefs satisfy this requirement. 
So it is unclear whether our realist theory of content, in the form of the teleological 
theory, applies to non-natural beliefs. Moreover, it is equally unclear whether a realist 
theory of knowledge has any grip on the non-natural realm: it seems odd, to say the 
least, to suppose that mathematical or other non-natural beliefs should derive their 
warrant from a posteriori reliable methods of belief-formation, from procedures 
whose reliability is testified by empirical evidence. 
Non-natural beliefs thus seem to fall outside the scope both of our realist theory of 
content, and of our realist epistemology. Given this, it seems appropriate to explore a 
different route to the vindication of non-natural beliefs, and to see whether they can 
be vindicated in an anti-realist manner instead. 
 I am here using "anti-realist" in the sense made popular by Michael Dummett, to 
refer to analyses of content which imply that truth does not transcend evidence, that 
there is no gap between a judgement being properly arrived at and its being 
true.  Even if such an anti-realist view of content is inappropriate to beliefs about the 
natural world, it may still be the right account of mathematical and other non-natural 
beliefs.  And this would then deal with any epistemological difficulties that may 
threaten such non-natural judgements:  for if there is no conceptual gap between truth 
and evidence, then there is no need for any further explanation of why ou r practices 
for making such judgements should be thought to yield truths.1
6.2  Content and Knowledge
Before proceding to the detailed consideration of mathematical and other non-natural 
judgements, it will be helpful to digress briefly and make some observations about 
anti-realist theories of content and knowledge in general, as applied to natural as well 
as non-natural beliefs.  As I have just observed, anti-realist theories of content have 
the epistemological attraction of promising to dissolve sceptical threats:  if your 
theory of content tells you that there is no conceptual room for properly arrived at 
judgements to be false, then you can stop worrying about the possibility of error.&nb 
sp; This is not of course an argument for anti-realism:  that certain philosophical 
problems would disappear, if judgements about trees were really just judgements 
about sensations, is not in itself a good reason for thinking that trees are sensation 
s.  Accordingly, anti-realist philosophers, from Berkeley on, have offered independent 
arguments for thinking that the content cannot outstrip evidence.  Still, there seems no 
doubt that the epistemological implications have always operated as a strong motive 
for adopting anti-realist theories of content.  (After all, the arguments for idealist, 
verificationist, and other anti-realist theories of content are scarcely conclusive;  and 
the conclusions, certainly as applied to non-natural beliefs, are pre-theoretically 
highly implausible;  it follows, I think, that something other than the arguments is 
needed to account for the widespread acceptance of anti-realist theories of content.) 
 On this question of motive, th e epistemological attractions of anti-realism of 
content are all the greater if you aspire to certainty as a requirement for 
knowledge.  For this strong traditional demand on knowledge adds weight to 
scepticism, and so to the desirability of a theory of content that promises to block 
scepticism at source.  This link between certainty and anti-realism isn't 
inescapable:  Descartes, for instance, managed to uphold certainty as a requirement on 
knowledge without abandoning a realist theory of content.  He did, however, need 
God as a guarantor of certain knowledge.  Without God, it is difficult to uphold 
certainty except by appeal to anti-realism.  For the only plausible strategy for 
achieving certainty without God is the anti-re alist tactic of collapsing the world into 
the mind by arguing that the contents of claims about the world don't extend beyond 
what what introspection and logical analysis guarantees.  (Note how this anti-realist 
move then aims to satisfy the demand f or certainty, the demand that we arrive at 
beliefs in ways that necessarily deliver truths, by arguing that the truth of our beliefs 
is conceptually guaranteed by the ways we arrive at them.) 
 Of course, anti-realism of content often has d ifficulty delivering on its anti-
sceptical promises.  In order for anti-realism of content to be all plausible, it needs to 
allow at least some distance between appearance and reality, needs to allow that there 
is something more to a judgement being true than that it is taken to be true on some 
specific occasion.  So anti-realism will quickly move away from the claim that the 
presence of a table, say, is just a matter of your current sense impressions, and allow 
that it also depends on what impr essions you will have in a moment, and on those 
that other people will have, and in the end on enough evidence to ensure that the 
relevant judgement won't be overturned by further discoveries.  But of course the 
more anti-realism moves along this dim ension, the less effective it becomes as a 
response to scepticism:  it is one thing to be certain about what sensations you are 
currently having;  it is quite another to be certain that some current judgement will 
never be overturned by future d iscoveries. 
 But we can leave these problems to proponents of the anti-realist programme.2  For 
it matters little whether or not they can fulfil their epistemological promises, given 
that we have good reason, as was s hown in 3.13 above, for rejecting the anti-realist 
theory of content in the first place. 
 Moreover, once we abandon the demand for certainty, and therewith the 
requirement that our methods of thought should necessarily produce truths, ther e is 
then much less initial pressure for a theory of content which makes truth a conceptual 
upshot of our belief-forming procedures.  The reliabilist alternative to the demand for 
certainty asks only for methods that are contigently reliable for trut h.  So from the 
reliabilist perspective there is no need to find a conceptual link between our doxastic 
practice and truth.  It is quite enough if we can defend a realist theory of knowledge, a 
theory according to which the reliability of our me thods is an empirical matter. 
6.3  Anti-Realism versus Fictionalism for Mathematics
Let me now return to the issue of non-natural beliefs.  As I said, it seems unlikely that 
we will be able to develop a reali st theory of knowledge for the non-natural realm 
which will defend the reliability of our belief-forming procedures on a posteriori 
grounds.  So perhaps here at least we should vindicate our beliefs by showing, in anti-
realist spirit, that truth does not conceptually outstrip the basis on which we make 
such judgements. 
 In what follows I shall concentrate on mathematical judgements.  It would be 
unreasonably ambitious to aim for detailed accounts of moral and modal judgements 
as well.  But at the end of the chapter I shall return briefly to morality and modality, 
both for purposes of comparison, and to offer a few promissory thoughts. 
 My procedure, in connection with mathematics, will not be to aim for some general 
semantic theory, akin to the teleological theory I developed for natural judgements, 
which will explain "aboutness" for mathematical judgements.  The welter of existing 
controversy which surrounds any philosophical discussion of mathematical 
judgements effectively precludes any such direct approach.  Instead I shall proceed 
indirectly, by asking about the epistemological consequences of mathematical 
meaning, rather than about mathematical meaning itself.  In particular, I shall ask 
directly whether an anti-realist epistemology is defensible for mathematics:  is truth, 
for mathematical judgements, nothing more than evidence, nothing more than being 
warranted by proper mathematical procedures? 
 In due course I sha ll conclude that this anti-realist view of mathematics is 
unacceptable.  This will implicitly establish that mathematical judgements have a 
realist semantics, in the sense that truth, for mathematical claims, conceptually 
transcends the basis on whic h we make such claims. 
 This then threatens scepticism.  I have argued that, in the case of claims about the 
natural world, the corresponding sceptical threat is blocked because our judgemental 
practices are reliable for truth as a ma tter of a posteriori fact, even if not by 
conceptual necessity.  I shall briefly consider whether any analogous strategy will 
work for mathematics.  But this line of thought will come to nothing. 
 So we will be left with a scepti cal --  or, more familiarly, "fictionalist" --  attitude 
to mathematics.  Hartry Field (1980, 1989) has done much to explain how such a 
position can work.  A detailed explanation is best left till later.  But in outlin e the 
fictionalist attitude will combine: 
(a)  a literal understanding of mathematical claims, as referring to abstract objects like 
numbers, sets, and so on, with 
(b)  a rejection of belief in such claims, and 
(c)  an acceptanc e of such claims as fictions which are useful for various pragmatic 
purposes. 
 The resulting position is closely analogous to the instrumentalist attitude to 
scientific theories adopted by Bas van Fraassen (1980).  Van Fraassen's scep tical 
instrumentalism avoids the contortions of earlier anti-realist brands of scientific 
instrumentalism, in that he takes scientific theories at face value, as literally referring 
to unobservables like atoms and electrons, and abandons any attempt to re construe 
scientific theories as merely making claims about observables.  He then combines this 
literal understanding of scientific claims with a refusal to uphold those claims as 
true.  Van Fraassen's view is that we shouldn't believe scientific claims about 
unobservables, but should simply "accept" them as useful instruments for making 
predictions, summarizing data , and so on. 
 I don't agree with Van Fraassen about scientific theories about unobservables, as the 
arguments at th e end of the last chapter will have made clear.  But I do think the 
analogous position is right for mathematics:  we should understand mathematical 
claims at face value, but should only accept them as useful instruments, not believe 
them. 
&n bsp; 
6.4  If-Thenism
I shall start, as I said, by asking whether an anti-realist theory of mathematical 
knowledge is defensible.  Is there an intrinsic link between evidence and truth for 
mathematical claims?  At f irst sight such a view may seem highly plausible.  After all, 
it is a familiar thought that, where judgements about the natural world answer to 
independent facts, there isn't anything more to mathematical truth but 
provability:  that what makes it correct to say that there is no greatest prime number, 
say, or that the real numbers are non-denumerable, is not that there is some 
independent world in which these facts obtain, but simply that these claims can be 
established by recognized methods of proof.  (My initial concern in this chapter is 
with pure mathematics, like arithmetic and analysis;  the application of mathematics 
to the empirical world will be discussed in due course.) 
 However, familiar as it is, this anti-r ealist view of mathematics faces 
difficulties.  Let me focus on the notion of proof.  What exactly are the "recognized 
methods of proof" in any given mathematical subject area?  An initial answer might 
be that in any such area mathematician s start with certain basic assumptions (which 
might or might not be formally recognized as "axioms") about the natural numbers, or 
the reals, or groups, or non-Euclidean spaces, or whatever, and then use logic to 
derive further conclusions as theorems fro m those basic assumptions.  Let us grant, 
for the time being, the appropriateness of logic for this purpose.  (I shall return to the 
epistemological status of logic at the end of this chapter.)  This leaves us with the 
axioms.  And her e there is an obvious difficulty, namely, that the axioms haven't 
themselves been proved.  Rather they are the point at which mathematicians start 
proofs.  So, on the face of it, it seems that mathematical proofs only establish that if 
certain a ssumptions are true, then certain other claims, the theorems, are also true. 
 There is a view in the philosophy of mathematics according to which mathematical 
assertions should be understood as expressing precisely such hypothetical 
claims .  This view is called "if-thenism".  Now, if "if-thenism" were true, then the 
existence of a mathematical proof would indeed conceptually guarantee the truth of 
the corresponding mathematical claim, and mathematical anti-realism would be vindic 
ated.  However, it seems clear that "if-thenism" is simply wrong about what 
mathematical statements actually mean (cf Resnik, 1980, ch 3).  Number theorists 
don't just hold that if there is a number 0, and if every number has a successor, and . . . 
so on for the rest of Peano's postulates, then there is no greatest prime number.  On 
the contrary, they hold that 0 does exist, and that every number does have a 
successor, . . . and consequently that there definitely isn't a greatest prime numb er. 
 We could of course understand "if-thenism" not as an account of what mathmatical 
statements do mean, but rather as an account of what they should mean.  On this 
interpretation, "if-thenism" would be recommending that we should re vise our 
understanding of mathematical statements, precisely so as to ensure that our methods 
of mathematical proof suffice to establish those statements.  But this then makes my 
point clear:  namely, that, as currently meant, mathematical state ments lay claim to 
more than mathematical proofs establish, thus undermining the anti-realist equation of 
mathematical truth with mathematical proof.3
6.5  Postulationism
The difficulty raised for mathe matical anti-realism in the last section was in effect 
that mathematical practice seems just to assume the axioms from which it starts 
proofs, and does nothing to establish those axioms.  But perhaps anti-realists could 
respond that the peculiarity o f mathematics is precisely that its basic assumptions 
don't need any further proof, on the grounds that the requisite mathematical objects 
will automatically be available to satisfy any consistent set of mathematical 
assumptions. 
 I shall call this attitude towards mathematics "postulationism", since it implies that 
no further justification is needed for a mathematical theory than the consistency of its 
postulates.  At first sight postulationism might seem to make mathematical existen ce 
unacceptably dependent on human activity, with mathematical objects somehow 
springing into existence as mathematicians formulate assumptions.  But we needn't 
understand the postulationist theory in such a strongly anthropocentric way.  Rather 
the idea could be that there is a timeless Platonist realm in which there are abstract 
objects satisfying any possible set of consistent mathematcial axioms, whether or not 
anybody has yet thought of those axioms.4
 This would of course mean that there are an awful lot of mathematical objects -- as 
well the familar objects of standard mathematics, there will also be such non-standard 
objects as all the different kinds of numbers modulo n, and all the shapes in all 
possible geom etries, and all the operators in all possible vector spaces, and indeed all 
kinds of things that have never been thought of and never will be.  But perhaps there's 
nothing wrong with that.  Large universes are scarcely alien to mathematics. 
 A more substantial objection to postulationism might be that mathematicians 
themselves make a distinction between those branches of mathematics whose 
existence claims they take seriously and those whose they don't.  The complaint here 
wo uld in a sense be the mirror image of the claim levelled against "if-
thenism".  Where "if-thenism" says that all mathematics is meant hypothetically, 
"postulationism" seems to imply that all mathematics can be asserted 
unconditionally.  But this then means that "postulationism" is open to a mirror image 
of the objection made to "if-thenism":  since there are branches of mathematics in 
which mathematicians do restrict themselves to hypothetical attitudes, considering the 
axioms as assumption s whose consequences are worth exploring, rather than as 
claims to be believed, it is wrong to read all mathematics as unconditionally assertible. 
 However, I think that postulationism has a reasonable answer to this complaint.  For 
t here is a natural way for postulationism to distinguish between those branches 
of  mathematics which it appropriate to understand hypothetically and those which 
which it appropriate to understand unconditionally, a way which seems to line up 
accurate ly with the way practising mathematicians make this 
distinction.  Postulationists can appeal to the distinction between sets of axioms which 
are categorical, in the technical sense of determining a unique model, up to 
isomorphism, and those which are not so categorical.  The axioms of group theory, for 
instance, are not categorical, in that quite disparate sets of objects, of different 
cardinalities, can form groups.  Peano's postulates, by contrast, are categorical (in 
second-order logic), in that any set of objects and relations which satisfy them can be 
placed in a structure-preserving one-to-one correspondence.  So the natural move for 
postulationism is to argue that mathematical objects are available to satisfy every 
consistent an d categorical set of axioms;  non-categorical axiom sets, by contrast, do 
not guarantee the existence of any mathematical objects, and so should be read 
hypothetically, as saying merely that if there are any objects which . . ., then . . . 
 This suggestion accords well with actual mathematical practice.  Mathematicians 
certainly seem to be committed, as I have already observed, to the numbers 0, 1, and 
all their successors, as existing objects.  By contrast, it makes little mathematical 
sense to talk about the identity element mentioned in the axioms of group theory.  Yet, 
even within group theory, once we add enough special assumptions to the general 
axioms of group theory to give us categoricity, then, in line with th e current 
suggestion, we do find mathematicians talking unconditionally about the simple group 
of order 68, the elliptic modular group, and so on, as if these special groups, at least, 
were as real as the number one. 
 So postulationism can answer the charge that it makes all mathematics 
unconditionally assertible. It simply restrict its ontological commitment to those 
abstract objects required to satisfy categorical mathematical theories.  This then 
implies, in accord with existing ma thematical practice, that only such categorical 
theories should be unconditionally asserted, and that non-categorical theories should 
merely be embraced hypothetically. 
 There is, however, another rather more telling objection to postulati 
onism.  According to postulationism, as now understood, all objects that can 
consistently and categorically be postulated thereby exist.  But how then does 
postulationism differ from a fictionalist attitude to mathematical objects?  If ever 
ything that can consistently and categorically be thought to exist thereby does exist, 
then won't Sherlock Holmes exist, and Santa Claus, and the Wicked Witch of the 
North?5  Perhaps it is natural to slip into unreflective acceptance of ca tegorical truths 
about numbers and sets and simple groups.  But if all this really amounts to is 
accepting what follows from assumptions agreed by mathematicians, why is it any 
different from accepting what follows from our agreed assumptions about S anta 
Claus? 
 The postulationist might object that the comparison is not fair.  If we take claims 
about Sherlock Holmes and Santa Claus literally, then these claims are about people 
who inhabit the same spatiotemporal world as we do.&n bsp; And on this literal 
reading these claims can be shown to be false.  Maybe the stories are internally 
consistent, but they aren't consistent with the totality of our beliefs about the 
world.  Which is why we don't in fact accept these claims literally, and why we don't 
accord Shylock and Santa Claus real existence, but only fictional "existence", that is, 
non-existence.  By contrast, claims about mathematical objects aren't about 
spatiotemporal objects.  So nothing forces us to reg ard them as literally false, nor to 
regard the objects they mention as mere fictions. 
 But I don't think that this is good enough.  It still seems to me that the postulationist 
story as told so far gives us no reason to view mathemati cal existence as anything 
more than fictional non-existence.  Maybe the definite reasons which force us to adopt 
fictional attitudes to explicit fictions don't carry over to the mathematical case.  But, 
even so, the postulationist hasn't told us anything more about what's involved in 
mathematical existence, other than that a consistent and categorical story can be told 
about the objects in question.  Such a story guarantees fictional "existence".  But if 
mathematical existence is to am ount to more than the non-existence of fictional 
"existence", then there must be something more at issue than an internally consistent 
story, for abstract objects just as for concrete ones. 
6.6  Reductionism
The l ast two sections have presented mathematical practice as an entirely "internal" 
business, in which assumptions are accepted and consequences drawn therefrom.  As 
long as we stick with this internalist picture, it will be difficult to avoid fictionali sm, 
for lack of any account of what makes the acceptance of basic assumptions anything 
but arbitrary.  But should we accept this internalist picture in the first place?  After all, 
isn't there an essential relationship, at least for the centralb ranches of mathematics 
like set theory and arithmetic, between abstract mathematics and activities like 
classifying and counting ordinary non-abstract objects? 
 Consider these two sentences: 
(1)  John is tall 
(2)  John is a member of the set of tall people. 
 Again, consider these two: 
(3)  (Ex)(Ey)(Rx & Ry & x*y & (z)(Rz -> z=x v z=y)) 
(4)  The number of rhinoceroses in England = 2, 
where "R" abbreviates "is a rhinoceros i n England". 
 Clearly there is an initimate relationship between the first and second members of 
these pairs.  On the surface at least, the second sentence in each case mentions an 
abstract object -- a set, a number -- whereas the firs t member is free of any such 
reference.  But, despite these surface differences, there is no doubt in each case that 
any non-philosopher who understands both sentences and accepts one will 
automatically accept the other. 
 The relation ships illustrated by these pairs hold out the promise of grounding our 
knowledge of abstract mathematical objects.  Given the close affinity between the two 
sentences in each pair, it is hard to see how there can be epistemological problems 
about the latter platonist claims, given that there obviously aren't any about the former 
nominalist ones. 
 However, to develop this idea we need a more precise analysis of the relationships 
illustrated by the above pairs.  In this section and the next I shall consider two 
possible such analyses.  I shall argue that both analyses run into difficulties, and that 
in both cases we are in the end forced back to fictionalism. 
 The first analysis -- let's call it the "reductioni st" analysis -- is that the 
quantificational sentence (3) gives the real meaning of the apparently platonist 
sentence (4).  (It will be convenient to focus on the second, arithmetic example, as it 
brings out the issues more clearly.)  On this vi ew, there isn't any real reference to the 
abstract object 2 in sentence (4) in the first place.  (4) is just a stylistic variant of (3), 
and no more commits us to abstract numbers that talk of doing things "for the sake of 
such-and-such" commits us t o sakes. 
 If we restrict our attention to pairs like (3) and (4), then this argument has a high 
degree of plausibility.  That there's one rhinoceros in England, and another one, and 
no more, indeed seems to be just what is meant by sa ying that "the number of 
rhinoceroses in England equals two".  So in this kind of case the apparent reference to 
an numerical object, two, can quite happily be viewed as a mere figure of speech.  (4) 
commits us to rhinoceroses, but not numbers.& nbsp; What is more, if (4) is 
equivalent to (3), it is easy to see how we could establish that it was true, by counting 
or some equivalent procedure. 
 So far this deals with statements that attach a number to a non-numerical concept 
like " rhinoceros in England".  But what about statements of pure arithmetic, like 
(5)  2 + 3 = 5? 
Here too the reductionist has a plausible line.  To simplify our notation, let us 
abbreviate (3) above as (E2x)(Rx), and u nderstand further numerical quantifiers (Enx) 
analogously.  Then the natural reductionist move is to read (5) as really saying 
(6)  (V)(W)[(E2x)(Vx) & (E3x)(Wx) & -(Ex)(Vx & Wx) -> (E5x)(Vx v Wx)]. 
That is, we can read (5) as saying merely that if there are two Vs and three different 
Ws, then there will be five things which are V or W.  The numerals here just indicate 
the kind of quantification involved, and don't refer to numbers. 
 It is by no mean s implausible that (6) gives the real content of (5).  What is more, 
(6) is a logical truth, and so, assuming still that we can give a satisfactory account of 
logical knowledge, the rendering of (5) as (6) accounts for our ability to know such 
truth of simple arithmetic as 2 + 3 = 5.6
 This then offers the model for a reductionist account of arithmetic in general.  First 
of all reductionists parse away apparent references to numbers as abstract objects in 
favour of qua ntificational constructions.  And then they aim to show that the truths of 
arithmetic reduce to truths of logic.7
 However, this programme runs into difficulties when we come to more complicated 
arithmetical statements, suc h as "there is no greatest prime number".  There is, it is 
true, a quantificational version of even this statement, which once more is free of any 
commitment to numbers as such.  But now the quantificational version is extremely 
complex, involvi ng not just second-order, but third-, fourth- and fifth-order 
quantifiers, and it becomes much harder to see in exactly what sense the 
quantificational version is equivalent to the orginal number-theoretic claim. 
 Perhaps the reductionist need not not be unduly worried by such complexity.  Why 
shouldn't the surface structure of arithmetical statements conceal hidden logical 
articulation?  But there are further problems. Consider again the simple arithmetic 
truth 2 + 3 = 5.  A couple of paragraphs ago I allowed that this was plausibly 
equivalent to a second-order logical truth.  But suppose that what we're counting is 
not rhinoceroses, say, but numbers themselves, as in "If there are two numbers which 
are F, and another three numbers which are G, then there are five numbers which are 
F or G".  In line with the reductionist programme, this will come out as a fourth-order 
logical truth.  And similarly there will be yet higher-order "versions" of 2 + 3 = 5. T 
he reductionist seems to be forced to say that "2 + 3 = 5" is ambiguous, hiding a 
number of distinct "real" contents behind its surface structure.  But this is surely 
unacceptable.  It's one thing to say that surface structure is misleading as t o the 
hidden content of arithemtical statements.  It's another to maintain that straightforward 
arithmeticial statements don't have an unequivocal real content at all.8
 To leave the example of arithmetic for a moment, it i s worth pointing out that 
similar problems of ambiguity will arise if we attempt to apply the reductionist 
programme to mathematics in general.  The natural strategy here would be (a) to 
reduce other branches of mathematics to set theory, (b) appeal to the affinity 
illustrated by (1) and (2) above to argue that the apparent reference to sets conceals 
the real quantificational content of the reduced mathematical theories, and (c) to aim 
to show that the reduced theories all are logical truths. 
&nb sp;  Two problems of ambiguity face this programme.  To start with, there is the 
point that the simple notion of set will correspond to different types at different levels 
of logic, analogously to the above way in which numbers come out differen tly at 
different logical levels.  And there is also an additional difficulty, because of the 
familiar point that there are in general many alternative ways of reducing braches of 
mathematics like real analysis, say, to set theory, all of which preser ve the relevant 
logical structure, but which give different set theoretical surrogates for given 
statements of analysis.  For both these reasons the thought that logical reduction gives 
the "real" content seems to lead to the unattractive conclusion that straightforward 
mathematical claims conceal hidden ambiguities. 
 In the face of such problems, defenders of the reductionist programme tend to shift 
position, and allow that in the end that mathematical statements, as meant by 
mathema ticians, do after all essay reference to simple mathematical objects like 
numbers, and that because of this such statements are both free of ambiguity and 
psychologically manageable.9  They thereby limit their reductionism to the mod erate 
position that the legitimacy of mathematical statements derives from the availability 
of logically true quantificational surrogates which don't refer to abstract objects. 
 However, this move takes away the distinctive claims of reduc tionism.  You can't 
have it both ways.  Either mathematical statements really do mean the same as their 
quantificational surrogates, or they do not.  If they do, you are stuck with the 
problems of ambiguity mentioned above.  If they do not, then the fact that we should 
believe the quantificational surrogates doesn't establish that we should believe the 
mathematical statements. 
 Of course there is still room to argue that the affinities between mathematical and 
quantific ational statements show why it is harmless, and useful, to accept 
mathematical claims.  But this is different from showing that it is right to believe 
those claims.  Indeed this position is not significantly different from fictionalism.  Th 
e reductionist is now arguing that it is legitimate to "accept" mathematical claims 
because they can in principle always be replaced by logically true quantificational 
surrogates.  But, as we shall see, fictionalists hold a very similar view, though for 
somewhat different reasons, in that they hold that our "acceptance" of mathematical 
claims about abstract objects is all right because in principle mathematics doesn't 
allow us to do anything that we couldn't do by logic alone.10  ; The fictionalist, 
however, goes on to insist that since these mathematical claims, which commit us to 
abstract objects, are not equivalent to logical claims, which do not, and since we have 
no epistemological warrant for this extra commitment to abstrac t mathematical 
objects, we ought to stick to the "acceptance" of mathematical claims, and eschew 
belief.  Similarly, once somebody of reductionist sympathies admits that mathematical 
claims do refer to abstract objects, and so are not equivalent to q uantificational 
surrogates, however significant those surrogates may be for understanding why 
references to abstract objects are useful, then the reductionsist has ceased to offer an 
argument for believing mathematics.11
 < H3> 6.7  Neo-Fregeanism 
I have just argued that, once we allow that mathematical claims commit us to abstract 
objects, then we cannot continue to view them as equivalent to quantificational claims, 
on the grounds that the latter do not comm it us to abstract objects.  Crispin Wright, in 
Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), disagrees, for arithmetic at least, 
on the grounds that quantificational claims do commit us to abstract objects like 
numbers. 
 Let us ret urn to the equivalence: 
(3)  (Ex)(Ey)(Rx & Ry & x*y & (z)(Rz -> z=x v z=y)) 
(4)  The number of rhinoceroses in England = 2. 
Wright agrees with the reductionist that (3) and (4) mean the same.  But he thinks that 
(3) gives the real meaning of (4), rather than the other way around.  That is, he thinks 
that the surface form of the quantificational (3) is misleading, and that we ought to 
recognize that underneath its surface it commits us not just to rhinoceroses, b ut to the 
number two as well. 
 Since he holds that arithmetic does commit us to abstract objects, Wright needs a 
non-reductionist epistemology for arithmetic. To this end, he introduces an 
equivalence between the following two schemas (whi ch is in effect a generalization 
of the equivalence of (3) and (4)): 
(7)  The Fs can be put into a one-to-one correspondence 
 with the Gs. 
(8)  The number of Fs = the number of Gs. 
Wright calls this eqival ence "N=", and he proceeds to show that it implies all of 
Peano's postulates, and hence all of arithmetic, in the context of second-order 
logic.12  The resulting system, which is closely modelled on Frege's Grundlagen, 
treats the num bers themselves as objects in the range of first-order variables.  It uses 
second-order quantification, but, unlike the reductionist programme, nothing 
higher.  However, where the reductionist programme promises to account for all 
arithmetical k nowledge as purely logical knowledge, Wright needs to add N= to logic, 
since there is no question of justifying statements which commit us to numbers as 
objects by pure logic alone. 
 The success of Wright's programme thus hinges cruciallyo n the status of N= 
itself.  Wright takes this to be a conceptual truth, despite the fact that (8) refers 
explicitly to numbers but (7) does not.  His line here is the same here as with (3) and 
(4).  He thinks that the reference to numbers a s objects in (8) is indeed to be taken at 
face value.  But he doesn't think that this undermines the conceptual equivalence of (8) 
with (7), because he thinks that (7) itself commits us to numbers as objects, even if its 
surface structure conceals th is fact. 
 In support of Wright's view that the reference to numbers in (8) should be taken at 
face value, we can observe that the numerical expressions appearing in (8) certainly 
seem to function like genuine singular terms in these, and o ther, contexts.  They can 
flank identities, they allow existential generalization, and so on.  This creates a strong 
prima facie case for reading these terms referentially,13 and provides a serious 
challenge to anybody who wants to de fend a non-referential interpretation (a 
challenge which, as the last section showed, the reductionist, for one, is unable to 
meet). 
 Yet, once we accept this referential reading of (8), then, given the conceptually 
equivalence of (8) with (7), it immmediately follows that somebody who asserts (7) is 
already committed to numerical objects, even if it doesn't look like it. 
 Or so at least Wright argues.  The difficulty with this line, however, is that by 
urging the genu ineness of the numerical singular terms in (8), Wright thereby 
undermines the analytic equivalence between (7) and (8). 
 Recall that the schemas at issue are: 
(7)  The Fs can be put into a one-to-one correspondence 
 ;  with the Gs. 
(8)  The number of Fs = the number of Gs. 
I am entirely happy to agree with Wright that instances of (8) are genuine identity 
statements which commit us to numbers as objects.  However, this claim surely takes 
away a ny original reason we had for accepting the analytic equivalence of (7) and 
(8).  For on the face of it, where (8) commits us to numbers as objects, (7) does not. 
 In Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Wright does not really ad dress this 
objection.  This is because he takes his main opponent to be the reductionist, and 
accordingly takes N= to be agreed as an analytic truth on all sides.  Wright's concern 
is then to merely to show that, once it is agreed that N= is ana lytically true, his 
reading of N= is superior to the reductionist reading.  I agree that the his reading is 
superior to the reductionist reading, if we assume (7) and (8) are analytically 
equivalent.  But my point is that, once we move to Wright 's reading, then we ought to 
question whether (7) and (8) are equivalent, as asserted by N=, in the first place. 
 After all, the most natural way to read (8) is as increasing our ontological 
commitments, beyond what is required by (7).&nbs p; If we adopt this reading, then 
we will agree with Wright that (8) involves genuine commitment to numbers as 
objects.  But we will deny, precisely for this reason, that (7) is analytically equivalent 
to (8).  After all, it certainly doesn't lo ok as if (7) requires us to believe in numbers as 
well as everyday objects.  We can certainly imagine a community, for instance, who 
understood statements like (7), but who had no notion of a numerical object. 
 Wright would object tha t the possibility of such a community isn't conclusive:  the 
crucial issue is whether, once the community has acquired the notion of a numerical 
object, it is then in a position to recognize that N= is analytically 
guaranteed.  However, we can c an agree that this is the crucial issue, yet still insist 
that the onus is on a Fregean like Wright to produce some argument for the analytic 
equivalence of (7) and (8).  For, as before, at first sight the relevant statements 
certainly seem to differ markedly in ontological commitment. 
 Wright holds, plausibly enough, that N= will play a central part in any adequate 
introduction to the concept of number.  But this doesn't suffice to make N= an 
analytic truth.  Consider an an alogy.  Some such thought as that electrons are 
negatively charged objects orbiting the nuclei of atoms is no doubt essential to any 
adequate introduction to the concept of an electron.  But that doesn't make it an 
analytic truth that, if there are atoms, then there are electrons.  For a commitment to 
electrons is an extra ontological commitment, over and above any commitment to 
atoms, as is shown by the example of late nineteenth-century chemists, who believed 
in atoms, but not in electron s.  What is analytically true is this:  if there are any small, 
negatively charged entities orbitting the nuclei of atoms, then those objects are 
electrons.  But this is not enough to derive, from claims about atoms, claims about 
electrons.  For that we need extra evidence that there actually are small, negatively 
charged entities orbiting the nuclei of atoms. 
 Yet this is what Wright seems to think we can do for numbers.  Let us grant Wright 
that any adequate intr oduction to the concept of number will contain the information 
that the same number attaches to equinumerous concepts.  Still, it doesn't follow that 
N= is an analytic truth. For, just as with the example of electrons and atoms, numbers 
may inv olve an extra ontological commitment, over and above that required by 
equinumerous concepts.  What is certainly analytically true is that, if there are any 
numbers, then the same number will attach to equinumerous concepts.  But this in 
itself d oesn't suffice to take us from premises about equinumerous concepts to 
conclusions about numbers.  In order to make that move, we need some independent 
argument for supposing that numbers actually exist. 
6.8  Mathemati cal Anti-Realism Rejected
In the absence of any such argument, I think we ought to reject Wright's neo-Freagean 
account of arithmetic.  And, more generally, I think that we ought also now to reject 
the overall anti-realist approach to mathe matics.  The initial objection to this anti-
realist approach, made in section 6.4, was that mathematical evidence, in the form of 
proofs, only seems to establish hypothetical claims, while mathematics itself consists 
of unconditional assertions.  ; In answer to this objection, I offered the anti-realist 
various ways of discharging the axioms assumed in mathematical proofs:  first, we 
considered if-thenism, which read all mathematical claims hypothetically;  then I 
discussed postulationis m, which argued that, for any consistent and categorical set of 
assumptions, the abstract objects exist which make them true;  after that came 
reductionism, which claimed that mathematical assumptions could all be construed as 
truths of pure logic;&n bsp; and finally there was Wright's neo-Fregeanism, which 
claimed that the crucial assumptions necessary to introduce abstract objects are 
simply analytic truths.  None of these strategies has proved defensible, and it is 
difficult to think of any ot her a priori argument for the view that the assumptions 
standardly made by mathematicians about abstract objects are automatically true.  It 
seems to me that is now time to conclude that no such anti-realist defence of 
mathematics is available, and t o accept that the content of mathematical claims does 
indeed conceptually outstrip the grounds on which mathematicians make them. 
 I realise that some readers will find this difficult to stomach.  Surely, they will say, 
the truth cond itions of mathematical judgements cannot possibly transcend our 
grounds for asserting those judgements.  Are not the contents of such judgements 
fixed by the grounds which our practice authorizes as sufficient for their 
assertion?  So what could possibly make it the case that a mathematical statement 
stands for something that goes beyond such grounds? 
 But my thesis is precisely that the contents of mathematical judgements are not 
fixed by the grounds our practice recognizes as s ufficient.  I am denying that such an 
anti-realist model of meaning is acceptable for mathematics.  It may be helpful, in this 
connection, to consider the fate of anti-realist thinking in the analogous context of the 
interpretation of scientific theories.  In the first half of this century many philosophers 
were attracted to the view that theoretical terms in science were a disguised shorthand 
for describing complexes of observational circumstances.  This was, of course, an 
absurdly co unter-intuitive view.  It is scarcely credible to suppose that scientists who 
talk about "electrons" are in fact talking about the behaviour of oil drops, tracks in 
cloud chambers, and so on, and not about the small negatively charged objects which 
o rbit the nuclei of atoms.  But philosophers had difficulty seeing how scientists could 
be talking about small negatively charged objects.  Since the authorized grounds for 
applying the term "electron" are always observable circumstances, what co uld 
possibly justify us in interpreting the scientists as making some further insecure 
reference to invisible entities? 
 Frank Ramsey (1931) explained how scientists manage to refer to 
unobservables.  "Electron" does not have its mean ing fixed just by association with 
the observable symptoms of electron behaviour.  It also gets its meaning from its role 
in a theory which postulates the existence of small particles which orbit atomic nuclei 
and are responsible for those observable symptoms.  Ramsey showed how statements 
about electrons can be read as existentially quantified statements, which say that there 
exist particles which are small, negatively charged, orbit atomic nuclei, have certain 
observable symptoms, . . . 
&n bsp;  In effect, Ramsey shows that talk about scientific unobservables derives 
from our ability to make existential claims about object which are not immediately 
accessible.  I suggest that this same ability makes it possible for mathematical cl aims 
to answer to proof-transcendent states of affairs.  In the case of arithmetic, say, we 
have a theory which postulates the existence of objects with certain properties, 
namely, just those properties which flow by logic from N=.  We call thes e putative 
objects numbers.  But the basis of our ability to make claims about numbers, namely, 
our power of existential generalization, is independent of any further abilities we may 
have to prove such claims. 
 It must be allowed, of course, that we have an established discursive practice of 
making arithmetical claims, and that a central role in this practice is played by 
N=.  But the existence of this practice does not justify N=, nor the arithmetical claims 
which follow from i t.  For, as we have seen, N= is not analytic, but a synthetic claim, 
which inflates our ontology by postulating entities we are not otherwise committed 
to.  As such it cannot be justified just on the grounds that it is part of an established 
dis cursive practice.  Analytic truths are justified by facts about linguistic usage.  But 
synthetic claims require some other warrant. 
 One last throw is available to mathematical anti-realists.  They can deny that 
"existence", in the context of mathematical discourse, is to be understood in the same 
way as in other areas of discourse, and thereby hope to argue, for example, that the 
"existence" of numbers is analytically guaranteed by facts of equinumerosity.  But this 
mo ve is not only unattractively ad hoc -- since there is no other reason, apart from the 
threat of scepticism, for suspecting mathematical existence claims of equivocation --
but it is also likely to prove a two-edged sword -- since the anti-realist will st ill have 
to explain what "existence" means for mathematical objects, and why it is different 
from fictional non-existence. 
 The argument of this section has in effect shown that mathematical discourse falls 
within the scope of the teleolog ical theory of content after all.  For I have now argued 
that mathematical terminology can be introduced, a la Ramsey, by existential 
quantification into theoretical contexts.  This means that mathematical discourse rests 
on no special vocabular y, but simply on the existential quantifier we use in general 
discourse.  A corollary is that the semantic realism of mathematical discourse is just a 
special case of the general semantic realism which emerges from the teleological 
theory. 
6.9  The Putnam-Quine Defence of Mathematics
If mathematical claims have a realist semantics, they face a threat of scepticism.  Still, 
perhaps this threat can be met.  After all, scientific theories are able to c ope with the 
threat of scepticism.  Perhaps mathematics can be defended against scepticism in the 
same way as scientific theories are. 
 This might seem a faint hope.  However, there is a well-known line of argument, 
propounded by Hilary Putnam (1971), and originally due to Quine, which seeks to 
vindicate claims about abstract mathematical objects by arguing that such claims play 
an ineliminable role in scientific theories about the natural world.  So far I have been 
taking m athematics to consist of pure mathematics, such as arithmetic and 
analysis.  But references to abstract mathematical objects, and in particular to the 
natural and real numbers, are also regularly made in the applied sciences, as when we 
say, "the num ber of planets = 9" , or "the distance-in-metres between two particles = 
5.77".  The Quine-Putnam point is that if scientific claims of the latter kind are 
epistemologically warranted, as surely they often are, and if those claims commit us 
to real n umbers as objects, as they certainly seem to, then claims about real numbers 
must be epistemologically warranted too. 
 An extension of this line of argument promises to vindicate, not just mixed 
statements of applied mathematics, as in the above examples, but also the axioms on 
which pure arithmetic and analysis are based, such as that every number has a 
successor, or that every set of reals has a least upper bound.  For these assumptions 
are presupposed in the mathematical calculatio ns which we use to derive predictions 
from scientific theories, as when we add together the numbers of stars in different 
galaxies, say, or divide forces by masses, and so can be argued to be confirmed, along 
with the rest of such theories, when such pred ictions prove successful. 
 From the point of view of my general epistemological framework, this argument 
amounts to a realist defence of mathematics.  Quine and Putnam would no doubt not 
think of it in this way, given their generallyp ragmatist attitudes to scientific 
truth.  But, on my account, scientific theories have realist contents, yet qualify as 
knowledge because the methods by which we choose them are reliable for truth as a 
matter of empirical fact.  So if mathematic al theories qualify as knowledge as part 
and parcel of scientific theories, then they will share this realist epistemological status 
with scientific theories. 
 One difficulty facing the Quine-Putnam argument is that it seems unable to acco unt 
for the difference between the research methods of pure mathematicians and natural 
scientists.  Where scientists actively seek to vindicate their theories by experimental 
means, pure mathematicians seek a priori proofs.  The idea of a pure m athematician 
trying to estbalish some mathematical principle by experiment seems silly.  Yet the 
Quine-Putnam argument seems to imply that pure mathematics and natural science 
share the same epistemological status. 
 This objection, ho wever, is less conclusive than it looks.  It is certainly true that the 
Quine-Putnam argument implies that basic mathematical principles are supported by 
observations.  But this doesn't imply that there will be some specific experiment that 
bear s on each such principle.  Rather, as with the basic laws of motion, large numbers 
of observations will contribute to the support of mathematical principles in a holistic 
manner, by confirming the overall theory in which they play a part. As to the r ole of a 
priori proof in mathematics, we can accept that basic mathematical principles depend 
on observational support, without denying the importance of exploring the purely 
logical consequences of those principles.  In line with this, we might view the overall 
scientific enterprise as containing a division of labour:  the scientists conduct 
experiments which will shape the overall tree of scientific theory;  while the 
mathematicians explore the purely logical consequences of the assumptio ns that lie at 
the root. 
 Perhaps there remains something counterintuitive in the idea that the axioms of 
Peano arithmetic have the same epistemological status as Newton's laws of motion.  I
shall not pursue this issue any further, ho wever, since there is a rather more telling 
objection to the Quine-Putnam argument, elaborated in Hartry Field's Science without 
Numbers (1980). 
6.10  Field's Fictionalism
Field argues that the crucial premise of the Quine-Putnam argument, that pure 
mathematics is an inextricable part of natural science, is unwarranted.  There are two 
parts to Field's claim here.  First, he argues that we can say everything we want to say 
about the natural world in "nomi nalist" terms, that is, without mentioning abstract 
objects.  When it comes to arithmetic, for example, his claim is that we can always 
describe the natural world using quantificational statements like "(E2x)(Fx)" or "F 
and G are equinumerous", and c an thus avoid any commitment to numbers as 
objects.  And in the case of geometry, to take another example, he argues that talk 
which commits us to distances as real numbers can always be dispensed with in 
favour of claims about relations of congruenc e between different spatial 
intervals.  Field argues that similar procedures will allow all claims about the natural 
world to be understood as free of commitment to abstract objects. 
 Second, Field argues that whenever we use abstract mathe matics to facilitate 
inferences between such "nominalist claims" --  and Field admits that abstract 
mathematics often enables us to find a simple route through inferences that would 
otherwise be impossibly complex --  we could in pri nciple always make the 
inferential step by logic alone.  As Field puts it, mathematics is conservative with 
respect to inferences from nominalist premises. 
 In line with these arguments, Field concludes that there is no good agument f or 
believing the claims of abstract mathematics, and that we should therefore reject these 
claims.  This doesn't mean we should simply away throw all mathematical claims as 
complete rubbish.  As I have just observed, Field accepts that mathemati cs is often 
immensely convenient for making inferences, and accordingly recommends that we 
should adopt the fictionalist view that mathematics is a useful pretence.  But the point 
remains that this kind of usefulness provides no basis for belief, but only for the kind 
of attitude that we have towards the statements in a fictional narrative, or --  perhaps 
a better analogy --  the kind of attitude that we have towards the Coriolis force, or 
towards the Newtonian theory of gravita tional forces in Euclidean space.  We don't 
believe in these theories or the entities they postulate, but we know they will work 
satisfactorily enough when certain purposes are at hand, and then we find it 
convenient temporarily to pretend that theya re true. 
 In a sense Field's motivations are similar to those of the reductionist discussed 
earlier --  he too wants to do without abstract objects.  But instead of arguing, 
implausibly, that our existing mathematical disco urse is free of commitment to 
abstract objects, his strategy is instead to admit that mathematics does commit us to 
abstract objects, but show how we could in principle manage without mathematics. 
 There are a number of technical difficult ies facing Field's programme, both in 
respect of the first claim, that natural science can be "nominalized", and especially in 
respect of the second claim, that, within such a nominalized science, mathematics 
won't ever underpin any inferences that logic can't (cf Malament, 1982; Shapiro, 1983; 
Chihara, 1990).  But for the most part I propose to skip these technicalities here 
(though I shall touch on some of them in section 6.15 below).  After all, there are 
strong prima facie reasons for expect ing them to be surmountable:  it would surely be 
surprising if descriptions of the natural world of space and time required essential 
reference to abstract objects outside space and time;  and it would be almost as 
surprising if logically possib le combinations of natural facts were incompatible with 
standard assumptions about abstract mathematical objects, as would be the case if 
mathematics were not conservative with respect to nominalist premises. 
 Suppose then that we agree th at abstract mathematics can be successfully extricated 
from the rest of science, in the way Field has in mind.  It is worth considering a bit 
more carefully exactly why the rejection of mathematical beliefs is supposed to 
follow.  After all, wha t Field has shown is that we can do without mathematical 
beliefs, in the sense that our scientific beliefs do not require mathematical beliefs.  But 
this is scarcely the same as showing that we ought to do without mathematical 
beliefs.  Why shou ldn't we still retain mathematical beliefs, in addition to scientific 
beliefs? 
 Consider the analogous issue as to whether we ought to have beliefs in scientific 
unobservables, in addition to beliefs about observables.  Craig's theore m shows that 
such unobservable claims are extricable from the observational claims, analogously to 
the way that Field shows mathematical claims are extricable from "nominalist" 
claims.  In this sense, Craig's theorem shows how we can do without belie fs about 
scientific unobservables.14  However, few philosophers nowadays would want to 
infer from Craig's theorem that we ought to do without such beliefs, that our beliefs 
about scientific unobservables are all unwarranted. 
&nbs p;  To conclude that we ought not to adopt a given belief, just because we don't 
have to, is to betray an overdeveloped taste for desert landscapes.  A better principle 
would be that we ought to adopt as many beliefs as we can, on matters that a re of 
interest to us, as long as these beliefs can be reached by reliable methods, and so can 
be expected to be true. 
 In line with this principle, and following the points made at the end of the last 
chapter, I would offer the following e xplanation of why we are entitled to believe 
theories about scientific unobservables:  the procedures that lead us to believe such 
theories are reliable routes to the truth, since nature generally prefers the kind of 
simplicity recognized by scientis ts to the kind of complexity that would obtain if 
reality were exhausted by the observable phenomena. 
 However, if this is our reason for upholding scientific theories, then why can't we 
defend mathematical theories in the same way? W hy shouldn't we argue that 
scientific theories which incorporate mathematics display a greater degree of basic 
simplicity than nominalized theories which don't incorporate mathematics? 
 This wouldn't be the same as the Quine-Putnam argumen t that mathematics is 
inextricable from scientific theories.  The idea would rather be that the addition of 
mathematics to scientific theories is justified in the same way as the addition of 
unobservable claims to observable claims.  This is a d ifferent kind of realist defence 
of mathematical theories.  Instead of arguing that the leap to mathematical knowledge 
is part of the leap to scientific knowledge, we are now accepting that mathematical 
knowledge requires an extra leap, but suggestin g that it might be achieved by the 
same technique as the leap to scientific knowledge. 
 However, if we examine this idea more closely, it doesn't really work.  We can all 
agree, fictionalists included, that the incorporation of pure m athematics into scientific 
theories adds to the ease with which they are manipulated by human beings.  But this 
is not the kind of simplicity at issue.  What guides us in our choice of scientific 
theories is not computational simplicity but phys ical simplicity, the kind of simplicity 
manifested by the atomic theory of matter, or the relativistic theory of 
gravitation.  These theories show that the world contains fewer independent 
phenomena than we might initially suppose, and as such accord with the general 
pattern of physical simplicity which allows us to gain knowledge of the natural
world.  But the incorporation of pure mathematics into scientific theories does not add 
to this kind of simplicity, but subtracts from it:  it requ ires that we should recognize, 
in addition to the nominalized world of distances, forces and other interrelated natural 
quantities, a world containing real numbers, and sets, and other purely mathematical 
objects. This might make it easier to do calculati ons, but it receives no backing from 
principles of scientific theory choice. 
 Field (1980) makes this point in terms of a contrast between "intrinsic" and 
"extrinsic" scientific explanations.  Mathematized scientific theories commit u s to 
"extrinsic" explanations, to the kinds of explanation which explain a body's 
acceleration, say, as depending inter alia on the body's connection (via a mass-in-
some-units relation) with a real number outside space and time.  A nominalized versio 
n of this theory, by contrast, will explain accelerations in terms of "intrinsic" masses 
which do not commit us to real numbers. It seems obvious that a theory which needs 
to invoke relations to real numbers to explain accelerations has less physica l 
simplicity that one which does not. 
 So, to sum up, the arguments in this section and the last show that pure mathematics 
cannot be be given a realist defence, either on the Quine-Putnam grounds that they are 
inextricable from scientific theor ies, or on the grounds that their addition to scientific 
theories adds to physical simplicity.  Since I can think of no other prospects for a 
realist defence, and since we have already decided against anti-realist defences, I 
conclude that we ought t o adopt a sceptical fictionalism about mathematics. 
 Bob Hale (1987, ch 5.II) has argued, against Field, that mathematical fictionalists 
cannot coherently maintain 
(a) that mathematics is false 
(b)  that the truth of mathemati cs is possible, and 
(c) that mathematics, if it were true, would have no consequences in the nominalist 
world that do not already follow from nominalist truths, as is required by Field's 
conservativeness claim. 
Hale's thought is that if mathematic s is only contingently false, then its falsity ought 
to make some nominalist difference, ought to manifest itself by the failure of certain 
nominalist consequences. 
 However, I don't see why fictionalists cannot maintain the conjunction of (a), (b) 
and (c).  Fictionalists are certainly committed to (a) and (b).  By definition they think 
mathematics is false.  And, since they take mathematics to be making meaningful 
existence claims, they do not think that its truth is ruled out by logic or concepts 
alone.  But there seems no obvious reason why they should not believe (c) too, and 
deny that the contingent falsity of mathematics need show up in the nominalist 
world.  After all, the fictionalist objection to mathemati cs is not that we can detect 
definite symptoms of its falsity in the natural world, but rather that neither this world 
nor anything else provide us with any grounds for believing it. 
 If there is an objection here, it is that lack of groun ds for belief might seem only to 
warrant suspension of belief, rather than active disbelief.  In the face of this objection, 
the fictionalist could simply acquiesce, and agree that we ought to combine our 
fictionalist "acceptance" with a neutrality o f belief, rather than an outright rejection 
of mathematics.  But this seems unnecessarily weak-kneed.  On our current 
understanding, mathematical theories invite us to inflate our ontology by adopting 
synthetic bridge principles.  If there are no positive grounds for these principles, other 
than that the entities they posit are possible, then surely the appropriate attitude is 
disbelief rather than neutrality. If someone urges that there are little green men on the 
first planet of Proxima C entauri, but by way of evidence offers us only that these men 
are possible, then surely we ought to reject this claim outright, rather than afford it the 
courtesy of agnosticism. 
6.11  Morality and Modality
Many o f the above arguments about mathematics are parallelled for morality and 
modality.  In both these areas anti-realism seems initially promising:  that is, it seems 
initially plausible that truth, for either moral or modal judgements, might be con 
ceptually guaranteed by the availability of some discursively authorized way of 
establishing these judgements. 
 However, when we turn to the details of our agreed discursive practices, they seem 
to hinge on certain crucial assumptions, ana logous to the arithmetical N=, which 
provide a bridge between non-moral or non-modal claims, on the one hand, and 
distinctively moral and modal claims, on the other.  For example, in morality we have 
bridge principles such as that killing people is b ad, and that causing happiness is 
good;  in modality we have bridge principles such as that anything provable from no 
premises is necessary.15
 But, now, when we ask for the warrant for these claims, epistemological difficu lties 
arise.  Reductionist readings, which say that "good" means nothing more than 
"increased happiness", or that "necessary" means nothing more than "provable from 
zero premises", seem clearly not to do justice to the intended meaning of the moral a 
nd modal terms.  Yet once we allow that moral and modal claims take us beyond 
claims about happiness and provability, then we can no longer assume that the crucial 
bridge principles are simply analytic truths guaranteed by the meanings of the terms i 
nvolved.  And this undermines the prospects for an anti-realist defence of moral and 
modal claims.  For if the bridge principles are substantial synthetic claims, we cannot 
simply maintain that they are somehow automatically guaranteed by the st ructure of 
our discursive practice. 
 On the other hand, there seems little likelihood of a realist vindication of such 
judgements, a vindication which accepts that the content of moral and modal claims 
take us beyond what our discursive pr actices automatically guarantee, but which 
nevertheless argues on a posteriori grounds that these practices reliably generate 
truths.  So the only option left seems to be some version of sceptical disbelief. 
 These moves are perhaps m ost familiar in the case of morality.  Thus Hume long 
ago pointed to the non-analyticity of moral bridge principles, by observing that you 
can't infer an "ought" from an "is";  and G.E. Moore's analogous objection to the 
"naturalistic fallacy" i s that it always makes meaningful sense, given any natural 
description of some situation, to query whether it satisfies any further moral 
description (Moore, 1903).  These doubts about the analyticity of moral axioms make 
it difficult to provide any anti-realist epistemology for morality.  On the other hand, 
once we do allow that the content of moral claims transcends the moral evidence, 
there seems little hope of a realist demonstration that this evidence is nevertheless a 
reliable guide to the moral truth.  (Moore's intuitionism can be seen as a desperate 
attempt to provide such a realist epistemology.)  So we seem pushed towards 
scepticism, and indeed we find this position explicitly defended in, for example, J.L. 
Mackie's error the ory of ethics (Mackie, 1977). 
 The same moves are also discernible, if somewhat less familiar, in the philosophy of 
modality.  Thus Simon Blackburn (1986, pp 120-1) argues that any attempt to build 
an analytic bridge between non-modal premises and modal conclusions must fail to do 
justice to the distinctively modal character of those conclusions:  how can the fact that 
our language happens to contain certain proof procedures guarantee that certain things 
are necessary?  Yet, if such bridge principles aren't analytic, it is difficult to see how 
modal anti-realism can work. On the other hand, a realist epistemology for modality 
seems even less likely than for morality.  So again we seem pushed towards some 
kind of fiction alist scepticism. 
6.12 The Non-Doxastic Alternative
However, there is an alternative to scepticism about morality and modality. So far I 
have been taking it for granted that moral and modal claims are expressions of belief. 
But perhaps we shouldn't read them in this way in the first place: instead of reading 
them as beliefs about some distinctive kind of non-natural fact, perhaps we should 
read them as expressing a distinctive non-doxastic attitude towards natural facts. Thus, 
as a first shot, there is the option of reading moral judgements as expressing some 
kind of impartial approval.16 And, similarly, there is the option of reading modal 
judgements of necessity as expressing our unqualified commitment to certain forms of 
argument.17
If such a non-doxastic account of moral and modal claims is right, then the arguments 
for scepticism fall away.  It will no longer be an i mmediate objection to the relevant 
bridge principles, for instance, that they are synthetic assertions that lack empirical 
evidence.  For, on the construal now being considered, the bridge principles will not 
be assertions at all, but rather prescrip tions or permissions about adopting certain 
non-doxastic attitudes when certain natural facts obtain.  That "killing people is bad" 
will no longer license inferences to moral beliefs about acts of killing, but simply 
prescribe a negative moral attitu de to such acts.  Similarly, that "propositions 
provable from zero premises are necessary" won't entitle us to any beliefs about 
necessity, but just endorse our unqualified commitment to syntactically valid 
arguments. There will of course remain room to debate the appropriateness of these 
prescriptions and permissions.  But the lack of empirical evidence for the 
corresponding assertions will cease to be an obvious objection. 
 This line of thought thus points to the possibility of a position about morality and 
modality, which would be manifestly different from scepticism, in that it would 
recommend upholding our existing moral and modal judgements, rather than rejecting 
them.  But this would not be because it recommended beli eving them, on either 
realist or anti-realist grounds, but rather because, on a proper understanding of their 
significance, questions of belief would simply not be at issue. 
 This non-doxastic suggestion about morality and modality raises some obvious 
questions.  What justification is there for denying that moral and modal claims are 
expressions of belief, especially given that they share many features of normal belief-
expressing assertions?  And, if is right to read moral and mo dal claims in this way, 
then why isn't it right to read mathematics similarly non-doxastically, and thereby 
avoid scepticism about mathematics? 
 In the next two sections of this chapter I shall try to answer these questions.  A final 
section will then say a bit more about how a non-doxastic interpretation might work 
for modality.  This issue, like the analogous issue about morality, about which I shall 
say little further, is far too large a topic to treat properly here.  But since the 
fictionalist account of mathematics needs various modal claims, it will be appropriate 
to finish this chapter with some brief suggestions on the topic. 
6.13  Why are Morality and Modality Non-Doxastic?
My suggestion is that moral and modal utterances be understood as expressing some 
attitude other than belief.  However, I can imagine that some readers will be dubious 
about the force of this idea.  What exactly is the significance of denying mo ral and 
modal judgements the title of "belief"?  In particular, what real difference is there then 
between my position, and that of an anti-realist who says that truth, for a moral or 
modal belief, is something conceptually guaranteed by the availabi lity of a authorized 
derivation within our existing practice?  After all, the point of the non-doxastic option 
is supposed to be that it allows us to continue upholding moral and modal 
judgements.  But if I thus allow that our existing practice for making such judgements 
is entirely appropriate to the content of those judgements, and that we are therefore 
quite entitled to the moral and modal judgements that we make, then what makes me 
different from the anti-realist who argues on just these gro unds that we should uphold 
moral and modal beliefs? 
 This query can be made even more pressing if it can be shown, as arguably it can, 
that the structure of moral and modal discourse closely matches the structure of 
discourses which do exp ress beliefs, in respect of conforming to the canons of logic, 
allowing conditional constructions, accepting that currently accepted views may come 
to be overturned, and so on.18
 However, I think that there is a good reason why it would be wrong, despite all 
these similarities, to assimilate moral and modal judgements to normal 
beliefs.  Namely that, on our present assumptions, moral and modal judgements 
behave differently from beliefs in epistemological contexts.  I argued in section 6.11 
that, if moral and modal judgements were beliefs, then the bridge principles which 
take us from natural premises to moral or modal conclusions would be 
unwarranted.  It is only when we view moral and modal conclusions as non-do xastic 
that we are free to read those bridge principles as acceptable prescriptions, rather than 
unevidenced beliefs.  So we need to deny the title of belief to moral and modal claims, 
if we want to continue upholding them. 
 It might seem as if this reason for denying the title of belief to moral and modal 
claims is purely a philosopher's reason, which doesn't reflect anything in the cognitive 
workings of ordinary people, but only philosophical anxieties about epistemological 
"justifi cation".  However, I don't think that questions about justification can be sliced 
off from the first-order reality of psychological states in this way. 
 By way of analogy, consider the case of a scientist who uses a theory about unobs 
ervables for making observational predictions, accounting for observable results, 
designing experiments, and so on.  According to Bas van Fraassen (1980), somebody 
can do all this, and yet be an instrumentalist in not believing what the theory says a 
bout unobservables.  Paul Horwich (1991) has queried the cogency of Van Fraassen's 
position here, on the grounds that, once scientists "think with" a theory to the extent 
that Van Fraassen allows, then there remains no substance to the thought that t hey do 
not believe the theory. 
 However, I think that substance can be given to this thought, contra Horwich, by 
taking into account the scientists' epistemological dispositions.  Imagine that it is 
pointed out to certain scientists t hat, despite its usefulness, a given theory does not 
satisfy the epistemological requirements normally imposed on beliefs about things we 
are not directly acquainted with.  The scientists' subsequent response will disclose 
whether or not they believe the theory:  if they are unperturbed by the theory's 
admitted epistemological shortcomings, then we can infer that their attitude is not 
belief, but merely instrumentalist acceptance;  on the other hand, if they are unable to 
view the shortcomi ngs with equanimity, and accept that they require a change of 
attitude, then this shows that their original attitude was belief.19
 The point of these last remarks about scientific theories has been to show how belief 
is distinc tive among psychological attitudes in answering to certain epistemological 
obligations.  And so, to return to the main thread of argument, if moral and modal 
attitudes do not answer to these obligations, then this is itself a good reason for 
placing these attitudes outside the category of beliefs.  This now explains why the 
non-sceptical position about morality and modality I have outlined in this section is 
genuinely different from anti-realism.  Anti-realism needs to show that our practic e is 
adequate for generating moral and modal beliefs.  I agree that our practice is adequate, 
but say that this is precisely because moral and modal claims aren't beliefs.  (If they 
were beliefs, they would then be subject to certain damaging ep istemological 
requirements, which would then leave us with scepticism, not anti-realism.)20
 It is perhaps worth emphasizing that in denying the title of belief to moral and 
modal judgements, I do not want to suggest that they a re unimportant, or that the 
difference between correct and incorrect such judgements is somehow arbitrary.  On 
the contrary, I fully accept that both moral and modal judgements play a central role 
in the thinking and action of human beings, and that their doing so requires that they 
conform to fully impartial standards of correctness.  I would also like to emphasize 
that I not want want to disqualify moral and modal judgements from the category of 
beliefs just because they report on matter which are non-natural, or abstract, or 
outside the causal world of space and time.  I have been happy to concede the 
possibility of such non-natural beliefs from the beginning of this chapter.  Indeed this 
is precisely my view of mathematical judgeme nts:  I take these to be beliefs about 
non-natural states of affairs (albeit beliefs that we have no warrant for adopting). 
6.14  Why isn't Mathematics Non-Doxastic?
This brings us to the next question: namely, if moral and modal attitudes can be 
saved from scepticism by the non-doxastic option, why isn't the same true of 
mathematics?  Why has my analysis of mathematics led to scepticism, rather than the 
endorsement of some non-doxastic species of mathematical judgement? 
 After all, isn't the fictionalist attitude to mathematics itself an instance of such a 
non-doxastic attitude?  Once we embrace fictionalism, then we uphold mathematical 
judgements -- not as beliefs, it is true , but nevertheless as claims that can properly be 
accepted-in-the-mathematical-fiction.  So why isn't this just another range of 
judgements that can be upheld because they don't express beliefs? 
 Well, once we do embrace fictionalism, then the resulting attitude to mathematical
judgements does evade scepticism.  But the difference between mathematics, on the 
one hand, and morality and modality, on the other, is that, prior to philosophical 
argument, most people adopt an attitude of belief to mathematics, whereas I take it 
that moral and modal attitudes are already different from belief.  Fictionalism, as a 
philosophy of mathematics, is thus advocating a revision of everyday thinking, where 
the non-doxastic account of moralit y and modality is happy to leave everything as it 
is. This is why fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics a sceptical doctrine:  it 
is sceptical about the beliefs that most people have, whereas the non-doxastic account 
of morality and mod ality has no corresponding objection to everyday thought, since it 
doesn't take everyday thought to involve modal and moral beliefs. 
 Is this contrast justified?  Is it true that most people believe mathematical claims, 
but express di fferent attitudes in their moral and modal judgements?  Well, this 
seems plausible to me, but I do not need to defend the thesis here.  For it is an 
empirical matter, a thesis about the psychology of actual individuals, not a 
philosophical issue .  In the last section I showed that there is a real difference 
between believing moral, or modal, or mathematical claims, and having a non-
doxastic attitude to them.  But, given this, the further question of how many people 
actually hold belief s, and how many hold non-doxastic attitudes instead, is a question 
for sociologists, not philosophers.  The essential philosophical point can be put 
hypothetically, in a way that abstracts from the actual psychology of individuals, and 
so applies equ ally to mathematics, morality and modality:  if people adopt beliefs, 
then they are wrong, and they should reject those beliefs, in a sceptical spirit, and 
switch to some less demanding non-doxastic attitude instead. 
 Still, as I said , it seems plausible that mathematics ordinarily involves beliefs in a 
way that morality and modality does not, and I shall continue to speak accordingly.  It 
may be helpful to offer a possible empirical explanation for this conjectured empirical 
con trast.  Note that it is entirely natural to view mathematical judgements, whatever 
their doxastic status, as essaying reference to a distinctive range of objects, like 
numbers, sets, vector spaces, and so on.  With moral and moral judgements, by 
contrast, it is by no means so obvious there is any intended reference to distinctive 
objects.  So there is a sense in which mathematical thought doesn't need any attitude 
other than belief to constitute itself as a distinctive mode of discourse:&nb sp; its 
range of distinctive objects already ensures that mathematical claims have a 
distinctive content.  By contrast, if moral and modal judgements do not refer to any 
distinctive range of objects, then there remains a question about what gives tho se 
judgements their distinctive contents;  and a natural answer to the question is that they 
express attitudes other than beliefs. 
 This story isn't incontestable.  For a start, you might question whether a lack of 
intended refer ence to distinctive objects does distinguish moral and modal claims 
from mathematical claims.  And, second, even if you do accept this, it doesn't 
automatically follow that mathematical claims must be understood as expressing 
beliefs, and moral and m odal claims other attitudes. 
 Let me take the latter question first.  Even if, as I have been suggesting, moral and 
modal claims don't have any objects of their own, it might still be possible to 
understand them as expressing distinct ive kinds of belief:  for nothing I have said so 
far rules out the possibility that such operators as "it is right that", and "necessarily", 
yield beliefs when applied to contents, rather than non-doxastic attitudes. (Though the 
arguments of 6.11 wou ld then still indicate a sceptical attitude towards these 
beliefs.)  Nor, conversely, does the intended reference to distinctive mathematical 
objects force us to view mathematical claims as beliefs:  after all, in a community of 
self-professed f ictionalists, claims about numbers, sets, and so on, would express 
fictional acceptance, rather than belief.21  Nevertheless, even if there is no logical tie, 
in either direction, between distinctive objects and the adoption of belie fs, the 
differing involvement of objects still seems to me to offer a likely empirical 
explanation of why people should have mathematical beliefs, but non-doxastic moral 
and modal attitudes.  For even if it is logically possible to combine objects wi th the 
absence of belief, and vice versa, it still seems psychologically plausible that people 
will adopt the attitude of belief to the objects they are introduced to in mathematics, 
but non-doxastic attitudes to non-object-involving moral and modal claim s. 
 There is also the former question, about the object-involving contrast:  am I right to 
hold that mathematics involves intended reference to objects, while moral and modal 
claims do not? 
 The first part of this clai m has already been established:  we have already examined 
accounts of mathematics which represent it as free from commitment to numbers, sets, 
and other mathematical objects --  namely, if-thenism and reductionism --  and reject 
ed them, precisely on the grounds that such non-objectual readings are not faithful to 
the standard content of mathematical claims.22
 The converse issue, however, is less clear-cut.  Thus there is the well-known 
"possible worlds" interpretation of modal discourse, which takes modal judgements to 
commit us to a range of non-actual universes.  And similarly it is possible to construe 
moral claims as essaying reference such distinctive entities as rights and wrongs, virt 
ues and vices.  I do not myself think these objectual readings of everyday modal and 
moral claims are compelling, but I shall not argue the point here, for little of 
philosophical substance hangs on it.  The question of whether moral and modal c 
laims involve reference to distinctive objects is once more an empirical issue, a matter 
of the actual contents of the thoughts of actual individuals.  And I have put forward 
the empirical hypothesis that they do not so refer only in order to explain another 
empirical conjecture, namely, the conjecture that such claims do not express beliefs, 
but some other non-doxastic attitude. 
 My only substantial philosophical contention remains the hypothetical thesis that, if 
anybody were to ado pt the attitude of belief to moral and modal claims, then the 
resulting beliefs would be epistemologically unjustified.  And to this thesis the 
possibility of object-involving interpretations of moral and modal discourse poses 
little threat.  Fo r if modal beliefs commit us to possible worlds, or moral beliefs to 
rights and wrongs, it will surely be harder, not easier, to justify modal and moral 
beliefs. 
6.15  Fictionalism and Modality
In this final secti on I want to say a bit more about modality, and in particular about 
the use that fictionalism makes of this notion. 
 Note first that fictionalism needs to make assumptions about logical consequence, in 
at least two places.  First, and most obviously, the claim that mathematics is 
dispensable in science rests on the premise that it is conservative with respect to 
nominalist truths -- that is, that no nominalist conclusions follow logically from 
nominalist-premises-plus-mathematics that don't follow from nominalist premises 
alone. 
 Second, fictionalists need the notion of logical consequence to identify what they 
mean by "mathematics" in the first place.  For the kind of mathematics that 
fictionalists think is dispe nsable, though nevertheless useful as a fiction, isn't just any 
old set of claims formulated in mathematical vocabulary (for that wouldn't be 
conservative, or useful), but rather standard, or accepted, or good mathematics.  So 
fictionalists owe us so me account of what standard mathematics is, some account of 
what exactly it is that they are recommending we accept as a fiction.  And the obvious 
account is that standard mathematics consists of all the claims that follow logically 
from standard mat hematical assumptions. 
 I shall now show that we fictionalists need to understand such claims about logical 
consequence in modal terms:  that is, we need to understand the claim that B follows 
logically from {A} as equivalent to it is not possible that {A} all be true and B false. 
 This may not be immediately obvious.  Why can't the fictionalist avoid modality by 
simply appealing to the standard characterizations of logical consequence in 
metalogic?  For exam ple, why not explain consequence semantically, saying B is a 
logical consequence of {A} if and only if B is true in all models in which all members 
of {A} are true?  Alternatively, why not offer a syntactic analysis, saying that B is a 
logical conseq uence of {A} if and only if B can be proved from {A} using a 
specified set of rules of inference? 
 The characterizations are unquestionably of great mathematical 
significance.  However, there are reasons why we fictionalists cannot re st with either 
of them as a philosophical account of logical consequence.  Let me take the semantic 
characterization first.  The obvious problem is that models are themselves abstract 
mathematical objects, and therefore, given the overall argume nt of this chapter, not 
something we can have beliefs about.23  (In the end, of course, we should be able to 
regard such claims about models, along with other mathematical claims, as useful 
parts of the mathematical fiction.  Bu t at this stage we still face the task of explaining 
what exactly the mathematical fiction comprises.) 
 The alternative metalogical characterization of logical consequence, in terms of 
syntax, specifies a set of rules of inference for movi ng between sentences with 
certain syntactic forms.  The normal objection to fictionalists accepting this 
characterization is that rules of inferences and syntactic forms are themselves abstract 
objects, and so inadmissible from our fictionalist persp ective.24  But this is less than 
compelling;  there seems plenty of room to view such syntactic entities as features of 
certain physical systems, namely, languages.  However, there are worse problems 
facing a fictionalist w ho appeals to the syntactic explanation of logical 
consequence.  These arise from the fact that nothing stronger than first-order logic can 
be completely characterized in syntactic terms.  So, for a start, there is a problem 
about the fictionali st delineation of standard mathematics as whatever follows from 
the standard axioms.  If "follows from" simply means whatever follows by first-order 
logic, then Godel's theorem tells us that there will be mathematical truths which do 
not so follow fr om the standard axioms, contrary to the fictionalist's delineation of 
standard mathematics. 
 A related Godelian difficulty faces the fictionalist's claim that standard mathematics 
is conservative with respect to bodies of nominalist assert ions.  For consider, as the 
relevant body of nominalist assertions, the claim that there exists a geometrical point, 
and another point, and then another as far away again in the same direction, . . .  By 
such means we can construct a nominalist version of Peano's axioms, which refers to 
geometrical points instead of the natural numbers.  But now there will be a 
"nominalized version" of a Godel sentence which does not follow logically from these 
axioms, if "follow from" means by first-order logic.  However, this nominalized 
Godel sentence will follow in first-order logic if we are allowed to add pure arithmetic 
plus appropriate bridge principles to the nominalist Peano axioms, since pure 
arithmetic will include the pure version of this Godel sentence.  The upshot is that 
pure mathematics, and in particular pure arithmetic, is not conservative with respect to 
bodies of nominalist assertions, if by "conservative" we mean that the addition of 
mathematics to nominalist assumptions gene rates no new conclusions within first-
order logic.25
 So a fictionalist cannot happily rest either with the model-theoretic or with the 
syntactic characterization of logical consequence.  Suppose, however, that we take the 
modal notions of necessity and possibility as primitive, and define consequence in 
modal terms in the way suggested above, as the impossibility of the premises being 
true and the conclusion being false.  This then evades the difficulties facing the s 
tandard semantic and syntactic characterizations.  There is no obvious commitment to 
abstract objects like models in this definition.  And since there is no reason to regard 
the consequence relation thus defined as restricted to first-order cons equence, the 
Godelian difficulties need no longer apply. 
 If the arguments of the last few sections are right, it follows that the appropriate 
attitude to claims of logical consequence will not be belief, but rather a non-doxastic 
attitude of unqualified commitment to the corresponding forms of argument.  Of 
course, there is nothing to stop us believing that, whenever the premises of such 
arguments are true, then the conclusions will be true too, that is, that such arguments 
are relia ble.  But the further thought, that these arguments are necessarily reliable, 
will not itself be a belief.26
 As I observed in passing earlier, a non-doxastic view of necessity raises the question 
of whether our normal crit eria for making judgements of necessity provide 
appropriate grounds for the relevant non-doxastic attitude.  In the present context, 
where we are using necessity to explain logical consequence, there are also a number 
of further technical issues, whi ch I cannot pursue here, about whether these criteria 
are adequate to the mathematical structure of logical consequence.27  However let me 
make just one point.  A standard soundness proof for some form of argument, such as 
is gi ven by the truth table for modus ponens, say, provides an obvious vindication of 
an unqualified commitment to the reliability of that form of argument.  Such a proof 
can simply be thought of as arguing in the alternative, for all the possible alterna tive 
arrangements of semantic values for non-logical expressions which would make the 
premises true, that the conclusion would be true too.28  So such a soundness proof 
provides an immediate basis for belief in the reliability of the form of argument in 
question.  And since the proof hinges on no assumptions save those about the 
meaning of logical expressions, it also provides obvious grounds for an unqualified 
commitment to that form of argument. 
1. There is a pr oblem of terminology here.  In some circles, especially American ones, 
philosophers like Bas van Fraassen are called "anti-realists", not because they hold 
that there is no substantial possibility of erroroneous belief, but, on the contrary, 
because they fear that this possibility is actual (cf Van Fraassen, 1980).  However, in 
my terminology, and in contemporary British usage, Van Fraassen is not an anti-
realist, but rather a pessimistic realist, that is, a sceptic.  To get things straight , we 
need to distinguish three positions:  anti-realism, in the British sense, which denies the 
conceptual possibility of error;  optimistic realism, which admits the conceptual 
possibility of error, but disputes its actuality;  and pessimi stic realism, or scepticism, 
which fears that error is not only possible but actual.  In what follows, unqualified 
uses of the terms "anti-realism", "realism", and "scepticism" should be understood to 
stand for these three positions respectively.&nbs p; That is, I shall reserve the term 
"anti-realism" for philosophers who uphold beliefs on the grounds they can't be 
false;  philosophers who reject beliefs because they fear they are false will be called 
"sceptics". 
2. For more on the different varieties of anti-realism and their problems, see Papineau 
(1987, ch 1). 
3. I would make the same point about contemporary "structuralist" or "modal-
structuralist" views, which read mathematics as saying only that there exist, or poss 
ibly exist, some objects satisfying the axioms, and that therefore the theorems are true 
of those objects, or of those possible objects, whatever they might be.  (Cf Lewis, 
199x, pp xx-xx; Hellman 1989, 1990.)  Whatever other virtues these views may have 
(but cf footnote 22 below), they are unquestionably revisionary proposals.  The same 
goes for Michael Resnik's (1981, 1982) more platonist species of structuralism;  this 
also faces extra problems, because of its reification of "struct ures" (cf Chihara, 1990, 
ch 7). 
4  I have found this position defended more often in conversation than in writing. 
5. Are these stories categorical?  The plethora of Santa Clauses who appear around 
Christmas might make us wonder.  B ut such stories can easily be made categorical, 
by including the explicit provisos that there is only one genuine Santa Claus, only one 
genuine Sherlock Holmes, and so on. 
6. It is true that (6) is a truth of second-order logic, and some philosophersw ill feel 
that this commits (6) to sets, thus reintroducing the epistemological difficulties of 
abstract objects.  But this is by no means uncontentious:  in a series of recent papers 
George Boolos (1975, 1984, 1985) has defended higher-order qua ntification against 
the charge of implicit reference to sets.  See also Wright (1983) pp 132-3. 
7. For an interesting recent version of this generally Russellian approach, see Hodes 
(1984).  Cf also Lear (1982).  It is worth distinguish ing this "reductionist" approach 
from the "if-thenism" mentioned in section 2.  Both approaches claim that there is 
nothing more to mathematical knowledge than logical knowledge.  But "if-thenism" 
does so by arguing that mathematical knowledge i s always knowledge that if such-
and-such axioms hold, then certain theorems follow.  The reductionist approach, by 
contrast, needs to show that the axioms (and so the theorems) are themselves logical 
truths. 
8. Hodes (1984) holds that the constru ction "the number of . . ." is systematically 
ambiguous, but gets disambiguated when the gap is filled in.  This is reasonably 
plausible.  What is not so plausible is the claim that "2" is ambiguous in "2 + 3 = 5". 
9. Cf Hodes op cit p 144-6 ; Lear op cit p 188-91. 
10. Note however that reductionism, as I have characterized it, is technically more 
demanding than Field's fictionalism:  the reductionist needs to find, for every 
mathematical claim, some (family of) quantificational surr ogate(s) which yields the 
same inferential power;  while Field is only committed to holding that all inferences 
underpinned by mathematical claims can be made by logic alone, and not to a case-
by-case pairing of mathematical claims with quantificatio nal equivalents. 
11. It is perhaps unfair to accuse Hodes (op cit) of wanting to have it both ways, since 
he explicitly embraces a kind of fictionalism (p 146), and to that extent explicitly 
abandons his reductionist ambitions.  Lear (op cit), on the other hand, does seem to 
want to have it both ways.  He shows how the possibility of holding reduced beliefs 
which do not involve abstract objects makes it both harmless but useful to work with 
mathematical propositions that do.  But he the n claims that this legitimates belief in 
the mathematical propositions. 
12. This provides a route to knowledge of arithmetic.  But what about the rest of 
mathematics?  Well, it is arguable that the rest of mathematics is reducible to set the 
ory.  Moreover, there is a plausible set-theoretical analogue to N=, namely, the 
conceptual equivalence of: 
(9)  (x)(Fx <-> Gx), and 
(10)  The set of Fs = the set of Gs. 
But of course, as it stands, this is too st rong:  without some restrictions on what can 
be substituted for F and G, Russell's paradox will follow.  Still, there remain weaker 
eqivalences which are both pre-theoretically plausible and powerful enough to yield 
set theory.  I shall not pursue this line of thought, however, since the criticisms I am
about to make of Wright's account of arithmetic will carry over to any analogous 
account of set theory. 
13. For details of this line of argument, see Hale (1987, ch 2). 
14. Of course , theoretical claims aren't conservative with respect to observational
claims in the strong sense that extra theoretical premises never augment the 
consequences of any set of observational premises.  But Craig's theorem does show 
that adding the clai ms of some theory to the observational consequences of that 
theory does not augment observational consequences.  So to that extent theories are 
dispensable for drawing observational conclusions. 
15. In what follows "necessary" should be understoo d in the narrow sense of logically 
necessary.  I take it that other kinds of necessity (physical, conceptual, legal, and so 
on) can be defined in terms of logically necessity (as necesary consequences of 
physical laws, conceptual laws, legal laws, an d so on).  In the case of physical 
necessity, there is of course the extra problem of distinguishing physical laws from 
accidentally true generalizations.  In my (1986a) I advocated a fictionalist view of this 
distinction.  I now think this was a mistake.  My current view is that we can 
distinguish physical laws as consquences of those true generalizations which have 
sufficient robustness to qualify as causal.  But that is another story. 
16. As, for example, in Ayer (1936, ch 6). 
17. Cf McFetridge (1990, essay VIII). 
18. Simon Blackburn (1984, 1986) has coined the term "quasi-realism" to emphasize 
the structural affinities between normal discourse and moral and modal discourse.  As 
it happens, Blackburn also upholds the "projectivist" view that moral and modal 
judgements express attitudes other than belief.  The question I am currently asking 
(though Blackburn does not) is why his "quasi-realism" doesn't undermine his 
"projectivism".  Fo r this point, see Wright (1987).  See also Hale (1986) for further 
discussion of Blackburn's position. 
19. So I agree with Van Fraassen, and disagree with Horwich, that it is 
psychologically possible to "think with" a theory, and yet not believei t.  But I 
certainly don't agree with Van Fraassen's further sceptical claim that this is the 
appropriate attitude to all scientific theories.  Cf my remarks about the epistemology 
of theory-choice in 6.10 above. 
20. Why exactly should belief be subject to epistemological requirements not imposed 
on other attitudes?  A short answer is that belief is that attitude which is supposed to 
represent how things are, as opposed to how they are taken to be.  This is why beliefs 
require evide nce, and cannot be made true just by being part of some established 
intellectual practice. 
21. Note that the intended reference to mathematical objects is the reason why 
fictionalism is the appropriate non-doxastic attitude in mathematics.  I hav e already 
explained why this non-doxastic attitude will involve a sceptical element: it requires 
us to reject the mathematical beliefs I conjecture most people to hold.  But such a 
sceptical attitude needn't be fictionalist.  To see this, imagin e a community who did 
have moral beliefs whose content derived from a non-object-introducing moral 
operator of the kind mentioned above.  Then, I say, we ought to reject those beliefs in 
favour of a non-doxastic moral attitude.  This attitude wo uld thus be sceptical about 
those people's moral beliefs.  But it wouldn't be fictionalist, for lack of any moral 
objects to populate the fiction.  In mathematics, by contrast, we have intended 
mathematical objects to provide our fiction. 
&n bsp; 
22. Even if such non-objectual views are wrong about the meaning of mathematical 
claims, might they not be defended as revisionary proposals?  This is possible, but 
there is an obvious respect in which the revision proposed by fictionalism i s 
preferable.  Fictionalism only requires a revision in attitude, where these alternatives 
require a revision in content.  Apart from this, the explanations of the applicability of 
mathematics offered by if-thenism and reductionism are technical ly more demanding 
than that offered by fictionalism.  The extra requirements facing reductionism are 
those noted in footnote 10 above.  The problem facing if-thenism is that it can only 
account for the applicability of mathematical theories to s ets of natural objects which 
provide models of those theories;  yet we often apply mathematical theories to setsc of 
natural objects which are too sparse to yield such models. 
23. For other objections to the semantic characterization of logical c onsequences, 
which apply even if you don't mind abstract objects, see Field (19xx) and McGee 
(1991). 
24. Cf Putnam, 1971, ch 2; Field, 1984, p 514. 
25. This Godelian argument is due to Shapiro (1983).  At first sight Shapiro's 
argument might seem inconsistent with the proof of the conservativeness of 
mathematics given by Field in Science Without Numbers.  However, what Field 
proves is that mathematics is conservative with respect to first-order nominalized 
theories.  The kind of geo metrical theory needed to mimic Peano's postulates, by 
contrast, requires more than first-order quantification, which is why it escapes Field's 
proof.  This leaves Field with a problem, however, since he himself requires just this 
kind of nonfirstord erizable geometrical theory to nominalize physics.  (Cf Chihara 
1990, ch 8 and Appendix.) 
26. This answers a point raised by Hale (1987, p 120). 
27. But see Field (19xx) for an investigation of a primitively modal interpretation of 
logical consequence.  I should make it clear that Field does not himself advocate a 
non-doxastic approach.  But it seems to me that many of his points could be adopted 
by someone who does. 
28. As a fictionalist, I don't want to read such so undness proofs as showing that the 
conclusion is true in all models in which the premises are true.  My idea is rather that 
they assume that (in actuality) either X or Y or . . ., and conclude that (in actuality) 
either the premises are false or the conclusion true. 
